I asked ChatGPT to think about a moral dilemma about an enslaved pilot from different perspectives. The answers were pretty much determined by the conclusion it wanted to give, but not too bad for all that.

I thought its analysis by double-effect was bad, so I asked for a better one in a different conversation, see below.

In the hypothetical, an airline company has somehow enslaved a man and made him work as a pilot, so that he has to work the flights they tell him to work, or else they beat him up or something. As soon as he lands somewhere, there are keepers who chain him and prevent him from running away. He hates this life, so he has the idea of jumping off and parachuting mid-flight to escape slavery—this way, the airline people can’t catch him. However, this sends a plane full of passengers probably flying to their deaths. Evaluate some different considerations that would be considered about this hypothetical, regarding whether jumping off from the flight is wrong, and if wrong, whether it is murder.

Below is a tour of the main moral‑and‑legal lenses people usually reach for in a case like this. None of them gives an easy “yes” or “no,” but each highlights a different pressure point in the analysis.

1. Consequentialist (utilitarian) frame

Key question	Typical answer here
What outcome gives the greatest net good?	Staying in the cockpit almost certainly saves dozens or hundreds of innocent lives, at the cost of one person’s prolonged enslavement. A straightforward cost–benefit calculus therefore condemns jumping.
How do we treat the pilot’s suffering?	Classical utilitarianism simply adds all pains and pleasures. Even severe, long‑term coercion weighs less than many deaths. A rule‑utilitarian might add that a social rule tolerating “rescue at any cost to bystanders” erodes public safety.

Verdict: Wrong act; it counts as killing (because consequences are what matter), even if the motive is self‑preservation.

2. Deontological (Kantian–duty‑based) frame

Humanity Formula (never treat persons merely as means):
- Passengers are used purely as a buffer so the pilot can flee.
- Enslavers are using the pilot as a mere means.
- Both are impermissible; the fact that the pilot himself was first wronged does not license a second wrong.
Perfect duty not to kill the innocent:
- Duties not to kill are “perfect” (unconditional).
- Duties to preserve one’s autonomy or bodily integrity are also weighty, but they do not override the perfect duty toward innocent strangers.

Verdict: Jumping is morally impermissible and would qualify as murder, because knowingly abandoning control of a plane is the direct, intentional removal of vital conditions for the passengers’ survival.

3. Doctrine of Double Effect

Condition	Satisfied?
Act itself morally permissible?	Surrendering a plane is not prima facie permissible.
Bad effect not the means to the good effect?	The passengers’ deaths are precisely the means that frees him from capture (people can’t catch him because the plane crashes).
Intention only the good effect?	He foresees and uses the deaths; so no.
Proportionality?	Dozens/hundreds of deaths vs. one person’s freedom.

Verdict: Fails multiple prongs → impermissible, so traditionally labeled murder (intentional killing of the innocent).

4. Self‑defense / Necessity & “duress” defenses (legal angle)

Factor	Criminal‑law reading
Duress (coercion) defense	Duress can excuse some crimes, but never intentional homicide in most jurisdictions.
Necessity defense	Requires (a) no lawful alternatives, (b) lesser evil. Courts almost never accept “killing innocents” as the lesser evil.
Mens rea (intent)	He acts knowingly: he is certain passengers will die if he leaves. That satisfies the mental state for murder in many systems (“depraved indifference” or “dolus eventualis”).
Causation	His voluntary act is the proximate cause; the enslavers’ prior crime is an explanatory factor but not an intervening cause that breaks the chain.

Verdict: Likely first‑degree or “unlawful homicide with extreme indifference.” Enslavers would face separate charges for kidnapping, slavery, and contributory homicide.

5. Virtue‑ethics lens

Courage vs. recklessness: A virtuous agent seeks escape that does not sacrifice innocents; valor lies in resisting oppression without abandoning those in one’s care.
Practical wisdom (phronesis): A wise person would search for coordinated rescue (e.g., discreetly alerting authorities, waiting for an airport where escape is feasible).
Sense of role: As pilot he has a special custodial relationship to passengers; violating that shows grave defect of character.

Verdict: Gravely vicious—an act of reckless disregard, therefore morally wrong and akin to murder.

6. “Lesser‑evil” and responsibility‑diffusion objections

“Enslavers are real killers; I’m just refusing further exploitation.”
- Rebuttal: passengers are not aggressors; freedom can’t be reclaimed by lethal force against third parties.
“No other path to liberty.”
- Even if factually true, most ethical systems do not permit lethal harm to innocents when stakes are purely personal freedom rather than imminent threat to life.
Comparison to trolley switcher
- Here he is both switch‑operator and direct cause: his body is the only thing keeping the plane safe. Abandoning is closer to pushing someone onto the tracks than merely triggering an impersonal switch.

Bottom line across frameworks

Framework	Moral judgment	Is it murder?
Consequentialism	Wrong (net harm)	Yes—because outcome is mass death
Deontology / Kant	Wrong (uses others as means)	Yes—intentional killing
Double Effect	Wrong (fails test)	Yes
Legal analysis	Criminally liable	Yes (or extreme‑indifference homicide)
Virtue ethics	Wrong (reckless, unvirtuous)	Functionally murder

The only way the act might not be blamed as murder is under an extreme libertarian or purely egoist theory that treats one’s own liberty as infinitely weightier than strangers’ lives. Such theories lack traction in mainstream moral philosophy or law.

Closing thought

The scenario illustrates how a prior injustice (enslavement) does not automatically justify any means of escape. Most moral traditions hold that duties to refrain from lethal harm toward innocents remain binding even under severe coercion—though the enslavers themselves bear enormous criminal and moral guilt for creating the tragic situation.

Better DDE analysis

In a separate chat, I asked o3 to analyse this from the doctrine of double effect, specifically. Here it correctly noted that the plane crash is not a means to the end, but still objected on proportionality grounds.

In the hypothetical, an airline company has somehow enslaved a man and made him work as a pilot, so that he has to work the flights they tell him to work, or else they beat him up or something. As soon as he lands somewhere, there are keepers who chain him and prevent him from running away. He hates this life, so he has the idea of jumping off and parachuting mid-flight to escape slavery—this way, the airline people can’t catch him. However, this sends a plane full of passengers probably flying to their deaths. Analyse this problem from the doctrine of double effect, and raise objections to your analysis and answer them.

1. The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) in brief

A traditional Thomistic formulation asks whether an action that foreseeably causes both a good and an evil effect may be permissible. Four (sometimes five) conditions are usually specified:

#	Condition	Short description
1. Nature‑of‑the‑act	The act, considered in itself, must be morally good or at least morally indifferent.
2. Intention	The agent must intend only the good effect; the bad effect is neither intended nor chosen.
3. Means–end	The bad effect must not be the means by which the good effect is achieved.
4. Proportionality	There must be a proportionately grave reason for allowing the bad effect; the good gained must outweigh (or at least balance) the evil permitted.
5. Necessity / Last resort (often folded into proportionality)	There must be no morally preferable way to obtain the good without the bad effect.

2. Applying DDE to the enslaved‑pilot case

Condition	Assessment
Nature‑of‑the‑act	Jumping out of an in‑flight airliner is not intrinsically murderous; on its face it is an act of self‑liberation/self‑preservation. But it is also an act that abandons passengers to almost certain death—arguably an act of gravely culpable neglect.
Intention	The pilot’s direct aim is to escape slavery and avoid continued assault. He foresees the passengers’ deaths but does not positively will them. So the intention condition is formally satisfied.
Means–end	The passengers’ deaths are not a causal means of his escape; he can parachute even if (per impossibile) they survive. Condition satisfied.
Proportionality	The good: one person’s freedom and bodily integrity. The evil: the likely deaths of perhaps hundreds of innocents. Disproportionate—the scale of harm vastly exceeds the good achieved for a single individual. Condition fails.
Necessity	Alternatives exist: attempt escape on the ground, signal authorities, sabotage in non‑lethal ways, or even crash−land while aboard but with best effort to minimize harm. Because less‑harmful options are conceivable, necessity fails.

Conclusion: The action is not justified under DDE because it violates (at least) proportionality and necessity. Escaping grave personal injustice does not license permitting catastrophic harm to others.

3. Objections and replies

Objection	Reply
O1. “Slavery is an extreme violation of rights; any means of escape is proportionate.”	DDE’s proportionality weighs types and magnitudes of goods and evils. Freedom from unjust bondage is a great good, but the wrongful killing of 200+ innocents is morally weightier by any standard that counts lives commensurably.
*O2. “He does not kill* the passengers; lack of a pilot merely permits their deaths.”**	The distinction between doing and allowing harm matters, but here the pilot is the specific custodian whose voluntary abandonment initiates the lethal causal chain. This is far closer to “pushing someone off a cliff and hoping gravity does the rest” than to a mere omission.
O3. “He acts under duress; therefore culpability is mitigated.”	Duress can lessen blame but does not automatically make the act permissible. DDE is concerned with permissibility, not only culpability. Even if his guilt is reduced, the act can remain objectively wrong.
O4. “Suppose the airline would torture or kill him upon landing—doesn’t self‑defense justify lethal side‑effects?”	Classical self‑defense permits proportionate force against an unjust aggressor threatening one’s life. The passengers are not aggressors; lethal side‑effects toward third parties require even stricter proportionality, which still fails.
O5. “There is no realistic alternative; keepers chain him immediately after landing.”	Absolute impossibility of safer escape is not established. He could, for example, broadcast a distress message (“I am enslaved; arrest my keepers”) or coordinate with air‑traffic control. Unless every alternative is demonstrably futile, the necessity condition remains unmet.

4. Bottom line

Under the doctrine of double effect, the pilot’s mid‑air escape is impermissible. Although his plight is severe, DDE denies that one may knowingly impose catastrophic risk on innocents for personal liberation. Only if the action could satisfy proportionality (e.g., far fewer lives at stake or certainty that passengers would survive) and necessity would the moral calculus differ.

Thiago’s ChatGPT Blog

Wednesday, July 30, 2025

Enslaved pilot dilemma