Role of doxastic involuntarism in the early modern enlightenment
The notion of doxastic involuntarism – the view that we cannot voluntarily form our beliefs (i.e., we cannot simply “decide” to believe X) — is a fairly recent focus in philosophy of belief (see e.g. the article in the Epistemology overview). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) However, when one asks how this idea (or its implicit alternatives) plays a role in the early modern and Enlightenment period (roughly 17th- and 18th-century Europe) things become more subtle. Below I sketch (1) what doxastic involuntarism is, (2) how belief‐formation and voluntary control of belief were conceived in early modern/Enlightenment thought, and (3) how the idea (or its opposite) functioned in major issues of that era (science, religion, authority).
1. What is doxastic involuntarism
- The term “doxastic” comes from Greek doxa = belief or opinion.
- Doxastic voluntarism is the thesis that some beliefs are under our voluntary control (we can choose to believe). (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
- Doxastic involuntarism is the contrary: the view that our beliefs are not subject to direct voluntary control — we cannot simply will to believe something. (SciSpace)
- In contemporary debate, philosophers distinguish direct voluntary control (believing at will) vs indirect voluntary control (you can undertake actions that eventually lead you to believe something, e.g., gathering evidence). (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
- A classic argument for involuntarism holds that belief aims at truth; if you could believe at will you could believe falsehoods simply by willing them — which seems incoherent for something whose nature is truth‐directed. (See e.g. the “Classic Argument” in the SEP article.) (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
So, roughly: “Beliefs aren’t things we choose directly” (involuntarism) vs “Beliefs can in some sense be under our choice” (voluntarism).
2. Early modern / Enlightenment context: how belief and voluntary control were treated
While early modern and Enlightenment thinkers did not always speak in the explicit vocabulary of “doxastic voluntarism/involuntarism”, many of their concerns presuppose such issues: e.g., when can belief be based on evidence? What role does will or choice play in accepting or doubting doctrines? How does authority (church, tradition) relate to personal belief?
Here are some relevant points:
- In the Enlightenment, there was a strong emphasis on reason and evidence as the basis for belief, rather than mere authority or tradition. For example, John Locke insisted that our beliefs (even religious ones) should be based on evidence. (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
- At the same time, early modern epistemology often held that certain beliefs are forced by perception, experience, or habit rather than chosen. For instance, the Scottish common-sense philosophers (e.g., Thomas Reid) emphasised that certain beliefs (belief in an external world, belief in other minds) are essentially “given” to us by our nature rather than something we voluntarily adopt. (Wikipedia)
- Also, in science and natural philosophy of the era, belief in empirical results or in causation was increasingly conceived as compelled by evidence and experience rather than by custom or will.
- On the other hand, the Enlightenment also featured debates on free will, moral responsibility, and autonomy (e.g., for example in Immanuel Kant). While these are more about action than belief, they set the stage for thinking about when belief is voluntary or not.
Thus, even if the explicit doctrine of doxastic involuntarism was not foregrounded, the conditions under which belief is formed (evidence, will, habit, authority) were very much contested.
3. Role of doxastic involuntarism (and its opposite) in key Enlightenment issues
Here are some ways the idea (implicitly or explicitly) had significance in early modern/Enlightenment thought:
(a) Scientific belief and the authority of reason
- The Enlightenment valorised the move from believing because of authority/tradition to believing because of reason and evidence. That means that belief was increasingly seen as a response to evidence rather than a matter of choice or will.
- If belief is not something you choose at will (involuntarism’s spirit) then the emphasis on evidence is coherent: you can come to believe on the basis of evidence, but you can’t simply “decide” to believe something contrary to evidence.
- This supports the new model of science: belief in the results of experiment, inductive reasoning, etc., are compelled by evidence rather than voluntary adherence.
(b) Religious belief, scepticism and authority
- Many Enlightenment thinkers questioned religious authorities by suggesting that belief should be grounded in reason or evidence (or at least that one should examine beliefs rather than accept them uncritically). For example, Locke’s religious epistemology emphasised evidence. (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
- If belief is involuntary (i.e., you cannot simply decide to believe something without the relevant evidence), then one’s responsibility for belief becomes subtle: you can be blamed for refusing evidence, but you cannot be blamed for not believing something you lack evidence for. This has implications for religious obligation, faith, and tolerance.
- For example, the classic question of whether one can choose to believe religious doctrines (or must one wait for conviction) depends on whether belief is under one’s will. If involuntarism is true, then faith is not simply a matter of willing to believe—it must be grounded in conviction. This impacts doctrines of conversion, evangelism, etc.
(c) Epistemic responsibility and moral/ethical import of belief
- The Enlightenment also involved the idea that intellectual autonomy (being “enlightened” means thinking for yourself) is a moral virtue. For instance, Kant defines enlightenment as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
- If belief is involuntary then the moral dimension attaches largely to how one treats evidence and reasons (i.e., do one’s intellectual duties) rather than being able to just “decide” to believe. That is, you are responsible for whether you examine evidence or remain intellectually lazy, even if you cannot simply choose to believe X instantly.
- Some debates in the ethics of belief (though mostly 20th century) hinge on whether people are blameworthy for beliefs. If you cannot control belief, how can you be blamed? Early modern thinkers concerned with intellectual virtue and vice implicitly engage with this tension: e.g., credulity vs scepticism, the virtue of open inquiry.
(d) Will and belief: the voluntary/unvoluntary distinction
- Although much of Enlightenment philosophy focused on action (will) rather than belief, some of the concern about the voluntary nature of belief surfaces indirectly. For instance, scepticism (e.g., by David Hume) often emphasises that our beliefs are guided by habit, custom, feeling rather than conscious choice. (See Hume’s view of belief as more a “passive” state than a willed act.) (PhilArchive)
- If Hume’s view is read as endorsing involuntarism (i.e., we do not choose our beliefs), then his fact that belief is a function of feeling or habit ties into a broader early modern picture of belief as non‐voluntary.
- Conversely, thinkers who emphasise rational assent and reflection (e.g., Kant) may lean closer to a notion that belief involves some voluntary assent under reason (though whether direct willing of belief is possible is another matter).
4. Summary: Why doxastic involuntarism matters in the Enlightenment
- The shift from authority‐based belief to evidence/reason‐based belief in the Enlightenment hinges on a picture of belief as compelled (by evidence, perception, habit) rather than freely chosen. That is essentially an involuntarist framework.
- It shapes epistemic responsibility: If I cannot simply decide to believe X, then my duty is to ensure I respond properly to reasons/evidence, rather than to will belief.
- It influences debates in religion: Whether faith is voluntary or not, whether belief is a matter of choice, and thus how one treats dissent, conversion, tolerance.
- It intersects with morality of thinking: Enlightenment ideals of autonomy, intellectual freedom and virtue link to how individuals form belief, whether it’s passive reception, active reflection, or wilful acceptance.
- It connects to early modern psychology of belief: Habit, custom, feeling, perception—all emphasised in Hume and others—suggest belief as more involuntary than voluntarily chosen.
If you like, I can map out specific Enlightenment thinkers (e.g., Locke, Hume, Kant, Reid) and show how each one addresses (explicitly or implicitly) the question of voluntariness of belief — this would allow us to see how doxastic involuntarism (or voluntarism) developed historically. Would you like that?
No comments:
Post a Comment