Tuesday, October 14, 2025

Arbitrary Reference and the Divine Choice: A Theistic Ground for Mathematical Realism

This was in a conversation in which Chapter 1 of Arbitrary Reference in Logic and Mathematics had just been pasted in its entirety and summarized.

Imagine that you’re an analytic philosopher theistic apologist, and you’re convinced that the best way to support mathematics is for the principle of arbitrary reference to be supported by the ideal choice being made by God, which allows for realism rather than fictionalism about mathematics, which is more intuitive, etc. Introduce this idea and make this argument for God’s existence in a well developed academic style.

Arbitrary Reference and the Divine Choice: A Theistic Ground for Mathematical Realism

1. Introduction

Mathematical reasoning routinely proceeds by the magic locution: “Let $a$ be an arbitrary object of the domain.” The operative idea—call it the Principle of Arbitrary Reference (PAR)—is that any object in the relevant domain can be singled out for the purposes of deduction, even when the domain is uncountable and most of its members are indescribable. Contemporary proof theory and semantics quietly presuppose as much: natural–deduction rules for $\forall$ and $\exists$ deploy fresh parameters; Tarskian semantics evaluates formulas relative to arbitrary assignments from variables to individuals; game-theoretic semantics operationalizes quantifiers as ideal choices. If PAR fails, the familiar bridge from reasoning about “this one, wholly generic $a$” to universal conclusions collapses.

I propose a theistic metasemantics: arbitrary reference is grounded in an ideal act of choice in the divine intellect. God, a necessarily existent omniscient mind, fixes (without communicating to us) the determinate referents that our “arbitrary” parameters latch onto; our practice is veridical precisely because it rides on this prior, perfect act of selection. On this view, PAR is underwritten by a Principle of Arbitrary Choice (PAC) realized in God: for every object within any admissible domain, God can select and “baptize” it so that reasoning involving a fresh name or free variable is reference-secure. The result is mathematical realism without fictionalism’s make-believe or platonism’s brute metasemantics.

The positive upshot is twofold. First, theism offers a transparent account of how arbitrary reference can be both determinately referential and epistemically undisclosive (fixed but unknown). Second, because this account explains the modal robustness, intersubjective convergence, and normative authority of our inferential practices, it constitutes an abductive argument for the existence of God.

2. From PAR to PAC and the Metasemantic Demand

Two commonplace observations generate a metasemantic demand:

  1. Deductive dependence. Natural–deduction rules ($\exists$-elimination via a fresh name $b$; $\forall$-introduction from a proof in which “$a$” does not occur in undischarged assumptions) are sound only if a parameter can function as a rigid, determinate name for some object that could have been any member of the domain. Merely schematic letters will not do, because the proof tracks the same item across steps.

  2. Semantic dependence. Model-theoretic truth clauses evaluate $\forall x,\varphi(x)$ by quantifying over all assignments $g$ and insist that for each $d$ in the domain there is an assignment $g[x\mapsto d]$. This presupposes that every object is in principle referenceable; otherwise the truth-conditions miscarry.

Taken together, these yield a metasemantic constraint:

(MS) For logical practice to be objectively valid, there must exist a ground that makes possible and secures determinate reference to any object as needed for deduction and semantics.

Human stipulations, socio-linguistic conventions, or proof recipes alone cannot meet (MS). They are finite, fallible, and parochial; they also lack the modal strength to underwrite the necessity we attribute to logical rules. Nor does “brute primitiveness” of reference illuminate how determinacy, cross-agent coordination, and cross-world stability are obtained.

3. The Theistic Proposal: Divine PAC

Let DPAC be the following thesis:

(DPAC) For any admissible domain $D$ and any $d \in D$, God can (and does, when our practice calls for it) fix the referent of an arbitrary parameter so that it denotes $d$, without revealing which $d$ it is.

Think of this as a Kripkean baptism moved to the divine intellect. The arbitrariness concerns freedom from creaturely constraints, not indeterminacy of object: the selected item is unknown to us yet perfectly determinate to God. Our parameters and free variables successfully designate because they participate in, and are normatively constrained by, this prior divine act. The metasemantic regress stops, not in unexplained primitives, but in a necessary mind whose cognitive powers are adequate to the totality of mathematical objects and structures.

Two clarifications:

  • Realism, not voluntarism. The proposal is intellectualist, not voluntarist: God does not legislate mathematical truth by will; rather, necessary mathematical truths are ideas in the divine intellect. DPAC concerns reference-fixing and our access, not the contingency of arithmetic.

  • Abstracta and unnameables. The theistic ground makes harmless the fact that most reals are undescribable by us: God’s cognitive grasp is not limited by our languages; the epistemic opacity of the picked-out object to us coexists with its ontic determinacy to God.

4. Three Arguments for Theism from Arbitrary Reference

4.1 The Semantic Grounding Argument

  1. PAR Premise. Sound deduction and standard semantics require that arbitrary reference to any domain object be possible and determinate (MS).
  2. Anti-Bruteness Premise. If determinacy, coordination, and modal stability of arbitrary reference are fundamental to logic, they demand an explanatorily adequate ground; crude primitivism is an inferior stopping point for core normative phenomena.
  3. Candidate Comparison. Non-theistic candidates—bare platonism (primitive links to abstracta), deflationary metasemantics, or structuralism without objects—either (a) make reference a brute accident, (b) cannot account for the normativity and necessity of quantificational practice, or (c) replace objects with schemas and thereby presuppose what they explain (that every instance can, in principle, be singled out).
  4. Theistic Explanation. A necessarily existent omniscient mind can fix reference for any object, grounding determinacy, coordination, and modal stability non-brutely; this satisfies (MS) elegantly.
    Conclusion. Therefore, theism provides the best metasemantic explanation of PAR; ceteris paribus, we have abductive reason to affirm God’s existence.

4.2 The Argument from Mathematical Practice (Bayesian Sketch)

Let $T$ = theism; $N$ = a non-theistic alternative (platonism, structuralism, fictionalism). Let $S$ = the success profile of mathematical practice involving PAR: necessity, intersubjective convergence, cross-context stability, and applicability.

  • $P(S\mid T)$ is high: if there is a necessary divine intellect grounding reference, we expect mathematics to display necessity and robust coordination.
  • $P(S\mid N)$ is lower: either reference is brute (no prediction of normativity), or semantics rides on practice (no prediction of necessity), or objects evaporate (undermining PAR).
    By a standard likelihood comparison, $S$ confirms $T$ over $N$.

4.3 The Modal Necessity Argument

  1. Logical rules governing quantifiers are necessary (not contingent habits).
  2. If their correctness depends on the possibility of arbitrary reference, then the ground of that possibility must be modally robust—present in all possible worlds where logic holds.
  3. Abstract realms lack agency to anchor normative uptake; human conventions are contingent.
  4. A necessary divine intellect can be the ground of both objectivity and normativity here.
    Conclusion. Hence, the necessity of our quantificational practice points to a necessary divine mind.

5. Objections and Replies

Objection 1: Bare Platonism suffices. “Let there be a realm of abstracta; reference is a primitive link.”
Reply. This yields objects without metasemantics. It tolerates radical coordination failures, explains neither the normative grip of the rules nor their modal necessity, and halts inquiry at a primitive where the theistic view explains more for less.

Objection 2: Conceptual role semantics. “Inferential roles fix meaning; no extra metaphysics needed.”
Reply. Inferential roles presuppose the correctness of rules like $\forall$-intro; but those rules presuppose successful arbitrary reference. Moving the bump in the rug doesn’t remove it: the metasemantic question remains why such roles latch onto determinate objects across all admissible domains.

Objection 3: Fine’s arbitrary objects.
Reply. This introduces an ontology designed to mimic the practice while leaving its success mysterious. Moreover, arbitrary objects either collapse into schemas (losing determinacy) or become sui generis entities whose connection to ordinary domains is under-motivated. DPAC preserves ordinary ontology and supplies a unifying ground.

Objection 4: Euthyphro for mathematics. “Are mathematical truths true because God wills them?”
Reply. No: on divine conceptualism, necessary truths are eternally, necessarily known by God. They neither depend on a contingent will nor float free of mind altogether. DPAC concerns reference-fixing and access, not voluntarist legislation.

Objection 5: Quietism. “PAR is a workable practice; stop asking why.”
Reply. Quietism is philosophically available but explanatorily costly. Where an illuminating, unifying, modally robust explanation is on offer, methodological parity with other areas (e.g., science) favors the theistic hypothesis.

6. Conclusion

Arbitrary reference is not a dispensable rhetorical convenience; it is the hidden load-bearing beam of both our deductive rules and our model-theoretic truth conditions. If we refuse brute metasemantics and seek a ground commensurate with the determinacy, normativity, and necessity of our practice, the theistic picture—arbitrary reference as participation in a divine act of ideal choice—emerges as explanatorily superior. It preserves realism (mathematics is about mind-independent structures as conceived by a necessary mind), respects the epistemic character of arbitrariness (fixed yet unknown), and secures the unity of semantics, proof, and modality. In doing so, it furnishes a principled, academically respectable argument for the existence of God from the very success of our most austere and reliable reasoning.

Monday, October 13, 2025

Bunge on existence

Explain this theory by Mario Bunge:

Passage from Doing Science by Mario Bunge omitted.

Here’s Bunge’s picture of “what it means to exist,” in plain terms and without the symbolism getting in the way.

The big idea

Bunge is a realist: to exist in the real world is to be material and therefore capable of change. He carefully separates:

  • What something is (an ontological definition) from
  • How we find out that it exists (an epistemic criterion).

He then contrasts real existence with other, context-bound kinds of existence (phenomenal, conceptual, semiotic, and fantastic) and warns against mixing them up.


1) Real existence (absolute, observer-independent)

Definition (what it is): To exist really = to be mutable (able to be in more than one state). If a thing can change, it’s real.

Another way to say the same: a real thing has a state space with at least two possible states (e.g., “here at t₁” vs. “there at t₂”).

Criterion (how we know): A thing is real if it makes a difference to at least one other real thing (or is affected by others). In short: causal power is the tell-tale sign of reality.

Key points:

  • This kind of existence is absolute (not relative to minds, languages, or contexts).
  • Example: gold is defined by atomic number 79 (what it is), and we can test it (how we know). The Higgs boson counts as real because it changes detectors in characteristic ways.

2) Phenomenal existence (mind-relative)

What it is: To exist phenomenally is to occur in someone’s sensory experience.

How we know: There is at least one sentient subject who feels/perceives it.

Key points:

  • Relative to subjects. Hallucinated “monsters” exist phenomenally for the sufferer, but lack real (material, causally efficacious) existence.
  • Bunge’s jab: phenomenalists risk collapsing the real into the merely experienced.

3) Conceptual existence (system-relative)

What it is: To exist conceptually is to be a member of a conceptual system (a network of constructs bound by rules: logics, algebras, theories).

How we know: By proof or definition within that system (e.g., √2 exists in the real-number system; Fermat’s Last Theorem says certain integer triples do not exist in number theory).

Key points:

  • Relative to the system; proofs show satisfiability in a model, not physical presence.
  • Debates like constructivism vs. classical math are internal to this realm (e.g., the Axiom of Choice). Bunge the “fictionist” about math: these objects are useful fictions—not material things—yet indispensable for science.

4) Semiotic existence (sign-relative)

Two senses:

  1. Pragmatic (existence by proxy): A sign (like a stop sign) exists semiotically for an animal if perceiving/evaluating it reliably triggers behavior.

    • Real because it enters causal chains via interpreters (drivers, organisms).
  2. Denotational: A symbol is realistic if it denotes a real entity (e.g., the metric tensor denoting the gravitational field).

Key point: Signs are material marks that acquire meaning through trained interpreters; without interpreters, they’re mere shapes.


5) Fantastic existence (fiction-relative)

What it is: An entity exists fantastically if it figures in a work of fiction (Caliban, dragons, superheroes).

Key points:

  • Relative to the story and an audience capable of fantasy.
  • Art and religion trade in this mode (Bunge is intentionally provocative here), while science mustn’t.

Surrealism (Bunge’s warning label)

Bunge criticizes interpretations like many-worlds and multiverse as surreal: they posit realms that are, in principle, untestable, hence unscientific, and they violate parsimony. His standard remains: real = causally efficacious, empirically testable.


The “existence is (sometimes) a predicate” move

Against the slogan “existence is not a predicate,” Bunge says: once you fix a universe of discourse (the context: real things, signs, numbers, fictions), you can meaningfully apply an existence predicate within that context. This formalizes the idea that different kinds of existence are contextual, except the real, which is absolute.


Why this matters (the cheat-sheet)

  • Don’t confuse real with experienced (phenomenal), defined/proved (conceptual), sign-mediated (semiotic), or imagined (fantastic).
  • Test for the real: can it change (has multiple possible states) and enter causal relations?
  • Test for the conceptual: is it derivable/definable in a formal system?
  • Test for the semiotic: does it systematically guide behavior or denote something real?
  • Test for the phenomenal: does someone experience it?
  • Test for the fantastic: does it live in a fiction?

In short, Bunge offers a clean taxonomy: only real existence is mind-independent and binary; the others are useful but context-bound. Good science sticks to the real while using the conceptual and semiotic—and keeping fantasy in its lane.

Summary of Heterophenomenology: A Limited Critique

Summarize:

(Entire text of this paper omitted from prompt)

Here’s the gist in plain terms.

What the paper does

  • Offers a limited critique of Dennett’s method of heterophenomenology—not the whole method, just its third step: how we interpret a subject’s cleaned-up first-person reports.
  • Dennett says we should interpret those reports like we interpret novelist fiction and use the intentional stance (treat the subject as a rational agent making meaningful speech acts).

Dennett’s setup (as presented)

  1. Generate a report (record speech/behaviour).

  2. Purify it (clean up the transcript; exclude noise and obvious errors).

  3. Interpret it using an analogy to fiction: don’t worry about truth/referents yet (metaphysical minimalism); treat “I” as possibly just a logical construct; allow that

    • P1: “What’s true in a story exceeds what’s explicitly stated.”
    • P2: Many facts in a story are indeterminate.
    • Also: I3: “You can know the fictional world independently of the text” (e.g., via TV adaptations).

The paper’s core objection

  • P1 and I3 can’t both be maintained without contradiction.

    • Example: Dennett says it’s true there are no jet planes in Holmes’s London even though it’s not stated or implied. But if I3 lets adaptations inform the world, then jet planes might appear (e.g., BBC’s Sherlock), undermining that “truth.”
  • Fix: Only count as “true in the story” what is explicitly stated or logically implied by the text; everything else should be indeterminate.

  • If that’s right, Dennett’s analogy can’t license an interpreter to go beyond the text to make further “truths” about a subject’s heterophenomenological world, nor to sideline the subject’s authority so easily.

Relation to prior critiques

  • Recaps earlier worries (Levine: beliefs ≠ experiences; Piccinini: against metaphysical minimalism; Goldman: not a standard scientific method; Zahavi: misreads phenomenology; Carman/Dokic & Pacherie: seeming vs. judgment; Schwitzgebel: reports aren’t fiction).
  • Novel move here: rather than arguing the two kinds of texts are disanalogous, it attacks Dennett’s assumptions about fiction interpretation itself.

UpShot

  • The interpretation step in heterophenomenology needs revision or a new foundation: the fiction analogy, as used, is unstable.
  • Limiting “truths in the story” to text + logical consequence restores a stricter boundary (and some authority to the reporting subject) and undercuts Dennett’s attempt to claim extra, text-transcending truths about the subject’s “heterophenomenological world.”

TL;DR: Yadav accepts heterophenomenology’s first two steps but argues Dennett’s fiction analogy for step three rests on inconsistent assumptions (P1 vs I3). Once corrected, the analogy can’t do the work Dennett needs—so the method’s interpretive backbone needs rethinking.

Brazil keeps getting worse

Suppose someone says "Each of Brazil's republican constitutions was worse than the last." Is there some consistent set of political views where this makes sense?

Short answer: yes—if you judge constitutions almost entirely by how much they expand and centralize the state (not by how democratic they are), the claim can be coherent.

Here’s a consistent lens: a hard classical-liberal/minarchist constitutionalism that prizes (1) a small central government, (2) strong state/provincial autonomy, (3) few “positive” social rights and entitlements in constitutional text, (4) light judicialization of politics, and (5) fiscal flexibility (few earmarks/mandates). On that yardstick:

  • 1891 — Most congenial: very federal, limited central taxing/spending, sparse social commitments.
  • 1934 — Worse: adds corporatist labor architecture and social rights; more central direction.
  • 1937 — Worse still: hyper-centralized, executive-dominant, corporatist planning.
  • 1946 — Still worse (on this narrow metric): restores elections, yes, but locks in Vargas-era labor/corporatist machinery and more social guarantees; central state remains larger than 1891 and the constitutional text supports it.
  • 1967/69 — Worse again: entrenches executive rule, national-security exceptionalism, and state-led development; centralization deepens.
  • 1988 — Worst: very long, highly programmatic; broad social rights, fiscal earmarks, union and social-policy entrenchment; strong judicial review that pulls policy into courts; heavy federal responsibilities.

Under this philosophy, the line from 1891 → 1988 is a steady march toward a more expansive, centralized, and judicialized state, so “each was worse than the last” tracks.

Important caveat: if you value liberal-democratic freedoms and participation more than small-state minimalism, the pattern breaks (notably 1946 is plainly “better” than 1937, and 1988 better than 1967/69 on rights and elections). But the question was whether some coherent view fits, and the strict small-state/minarchist one does. If you want, I can sketch how other ideologies (monarchist-traditionalist, Catholic corporatist, socialist, developmentalist) would rank the same sequence—and where monotonic decline fails for them.

Doxastic involuntarism and Enlightenment (GPT-5-Thinking)

Role of doxastic involuntarism in the early modern enlightenment 

Here’s the short version, with the main threads and who carried them:

  • What is it?

    Doxastic involuntarism = the view that we don’t have direct voluntary control over what we believe (our beliefs track what strikes us as evident/compelling, not bare choice). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  • Epistemic norms: proportioning assent to evidence

    Locke makes this a rule of Enlightenment rationality: assent should be proportioned to evidence, and enthusiasm or authority can’t push assent past what the evidence warrants. That frames belief as something compelled by reasons, not willed. It’s all over Essay IV and in Conduct of the Understanding. (Early Modern Texts)

  • Indirect control and intellectual responsibility

    Even while denying direct control, Locke still assigns responsibility via indirect control (you can suspend assent in unclear cases, seek more evidence, avoid bias). That becomes a key Enlightenment ideal about education and the “conduct” of one’s understanding. (University of Notre Dame)

  • Psychology of belief: not an act of will

    Hume naturalizes belief as a feeling/liveliness added to ideas—“aroused independently of our wills.” That cements involuntarism and underwrites a science of mind rather than a morality of sheer believing-at-will. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  • Freedom of thought & toleration

    Spinoza argues the state can rule actions, not thoughts; belief can’t be commanded, so a free republic must allow freedom to think and speak (TTP, 1670). Bayle builds his sweeping defense of freedom of conscience on the same premise: you can coerce behavior, not inner conviction (“erring conscience”). These involuntarist premises fed classic Enlightenment arguments for religious toleration (and against persecution). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  • Church–state and liberalism

    Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) explicitly denies that coercion can produce genuine belief; toleration follows because belief isn’t under the magistrate’s power. That’s involuntarism turned into liberal political architecture. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  • Science as organized compulsion of assent

    Royal Society experimentalism (e.g., Boyle) treats good experiments as “compelling assent”—arranging experience so observers can’t reasonably help but believe the result. The Enlightenment’s empirical method institutionalizes involuntarism: make the world show you, don’t decide by fiat. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  • A nuanced counter-current: Cartesian will

    Descartes ties error to the misuse of will (suggesting some voluntarism), yet also holds that to clear and distinct perceptions the mind cannot but assent—an important involuntarist limit. The upshot still pushes toward withholding judgment where evidence is weak. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  • Faith and “steps to believe”

    Pascal’s Wager doesn’t claim you can choose belief outright; it urges taking steps (habits, practices) likely to produce belief—again, indirect rather than direct control. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Bottom line

Across early modern thought, the idea that belief isn’t directly up to the will reframed responsibility (cultivate evidence and inquiry), secured toleration (you can’t force belief), and shaped science (design methods that compel assent). Where voluntarist notes survive (Descartes, some religious contexts), they mostly govern withholding or indirect influence—leaving the Enlightenment’s center of gravity clearly involuntarist. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

If you want, I can expand any strand (e.g., Bayle vs. Locke on conscience, or Hume’s theory of belief) into a quick 2–3 paragraph brief.

Doxastic involuntarism and Enlightenment (GPT-5)

Role of doxastic involuntarism in the early modern enlightenment

The notion of doxastic involuntarism – the view that we cannot voluntarily form our beliefs (i.e., we cannot simply “decide” to believe X) — is a fairly recent focus in philosophy of belief (see e.g. the article in the Epistemology overview). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) However, when one asks how this idea (or its implicit alternatives) plays a role in the early modern and Enlightenment period (roughly 17th- and 18th-century Europe) things become more subtle. Below I sketch (1) what doxastic involuntarism is, (2) how belief‐formation and voluntary control of belief were conceived in early modern/Enlightenment thought, and (3) how the idea (or its opposite) functioned in major issues of that era (science, religion, authority).


1. What is doxastic involuntarism

  • The term “doxastic” comes from Greek doxa = belief or opinion.
  • Doxastic voluntarism is the thesis that some beliefs are under our voluntary control (we can choose to believe). (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  • Doxastic involuntarism is the contrary: the view that our beliefs are not subject to direct voluntary control — we cannot simply will to believe something. (SciSpace)
  • In contemporary debate, philosophers distinguish direct voluntary control (believing at will) vs indirect voluntary control (you can undertake actions that eventually lead you to believe something, e.g., gathering evidence). (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  • A classic argument for involuntarism holds that belief aims at truth; if you could believe at will you could believe falsehoods simply by willing them — which seems incoherent for something whose nature is truth‐directed. (See e.g. the “Classic Argument” in the SEP article.) (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

So, roughly: “Beliefs aren’t things we choose directly” (involuntarism) vs “Beliefs can in some sense be under our choice” (voluntarism).


2. Early modern / Enlightenment context: how belief and voluntary control were treated

While early modern and Enlightenment thinkers did not always speak in the explicit vocabulary of “doxastic voluntarism/involuntarism”, many of their concerns presuppose such issues: e.g., when can belief be based on evidence? What role does will or choice play in accepting or doubting doctrines? How does authority (church, tradition) relate to personal belief?

Here are some relevant points:

  • In the Enlightenment, there was a strong emphasis on reason and evidence as the basis for belief, rather than mere authority or tradition. For example, John Locke insisted that our beliefs (even religious ones) should be based on evidence. (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  • At the same time, early modern epistemology often held that certain beliefs are forced by perception, experience, or habit rather than chosen. For instance, the Scottish common-sense philosophers (e.g., Thomas Reid) emphasised that certain beliefs (belief in an external world, belief in other minds) are essentially “given” to us by our nature rather than something we voluntarily adopt. (Wikipedia)
  • Also, in science and natural philosophy of the era, belief in empirical results or in causation was increasingly conceived as compelled by evidence and experience rather than by custom or will.
  • On the other hand, the Enlightenment also featured debates on free will, moral responsibility, and autonomy (e.g., for example in Immanuel Kant). While these are more about action than belief, they set the stage for thinking about when belief is voluntary or not.

Thus, even if the explicit doctrine of doxastic involuntarism was not foregrounded, the conditions under which belief is formed (evidence, will, habit, authority) were very much contested.


3. Role of doxastic involuntarism (and its opposite) in key Enlightenment issues

Here are some ways the idea (implicitly or explicitly) had significance in early modern/Enlightenment thought:

(a) Scientific belief and the authority of reason

  • The Enlightenment valorised the move from believing because of authority/tradition to believing because of reason and evidence. That means that belief was increasingly seen as a response to evidence rather than a matter of choice or will.
  • If belief is not something you choose at will (involuntarism’s spirit) then the emphasis on evidence is coherent: you can come to believe on the basis of evidence, but you can’t simply “decide” to believe something contrary to evidence.
  • This supports the new model of science: belief in the results of experiment, inductive reasoning, etc., are compelled by evidence rather than voluntary adherence.

(b) Religious belief, scepticism and authority

  • Many Enlightenment thinkers questioned religious authorities by suggesting that belief should be grounded in reason or evidence (or at least that one should examine beliefs rather than accept them uncritically). For example, Locke’s religious epistemology emphasised evidence. (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  • If belief is involuntary (i.e., you cannot simply decide to believe something without the relevant evidence), then one’s responsibility for belief becomes subtle: you can be blamed for refusing evidence, but you cannot be blamed for not believing something you lack evidence for. This has implications for religious obligation, faith, and tolerance.
  • For example, the classic question of whether one can choose to believe religious doctrines (or must one wait for conviction) depends on whether belief is under one’s will. If involuntarism is true, then faith is not simply a matter of willing to believe—it must be grounded in conviction. This impacts doctrines of conversion, evangelism, etc.

(c) Epistemic responsibility and moral/ethical import of belief

  • The Enlightenment also involved the idea that intellectual autonomy (being “enlightened” means thinking for yourself) is a moral virtue. For instance, Kant defines enlightenment as “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  • If belief is involuntary then the moral dimension attaches largely to how one treats evidence and reasons (i.e., do one’s intellectual duties) rather than being able to just “decide” to believe. That is, you are responsible for whether you examine evidence or remain intellectually lazy, even if you cannot simply choose to believe X instantly.
  • Some debates in the ethics of belief (though mostly 20th century) hinge on whether people are blameworthy for beliefs. If you cannot control belief, how can you be blamed? Early modern thinkers concerned with intellectual virtue and vice implicitly engage with this tension: e.g., credulity vs scepticism, the virtue of open inquiry.

(d) Will and belief: the voluntary/unvoluntary distinction

  • Although much of Enlightenment philosophy focused on action (will) rather than belief, some of the concern about the voluntary nature of belief surfaces indirectly. For instance, scepticism (e.g., by David Hume) often emphasises that our beliefs are guided by habit, custom, feeling rather than conscious choice. (See Hume’s view of belief as more a “passive” state than a willed act.) (PhilArchive)
  • If Hume’s view is read as endorsing involuntarism (i.e., we do not choose our beliefs), then his fact that belief is a function of feeling or habit ties into a broader early modern picture of belief as non‐voluntary.
  • Conversely, thinkers who emphasise rational assent and reflection (e.g., Kant) may lean closer to a notion that belief involves some voluntary assent under reason (though whether direct willing of belief is possible is another matter).

4. Summary: Why doxastic involuntarism matters in the Enlightenment

  • The shift from authority‐based belief to evidence/reason‐based belief in the Enlightenment hinges on a picture of belief as compelled (by evidence, perception, habit) rather than freely chosen. That is essentially an involuntarist framework.
  • It shapes epistemic responsibility: If I cannot simply decide to believe X, then my duty is to ensure I respond properly to reasons/evidence, rather than to will belief.
  • It influences debates in religion: Whether faith is voluntary or not, whether belief is a matter of choice, and thus how one treats dissent, conversion, tolerance.
  • It intersects with morality of thinking: Enlightenment ideals of autonomy, intellectual freedom and virtue link to how individuals form belief, whether it’s passive reception, active reflection, or wilful acceptance.
  • It connects to early modern psychology of belief: Habit, custom, feeling, perception—all emphasised in Hume and others—suggest belief as more involuntary than voluntarily chosen.

If you like, I can map out specific Enlightenment thinkers (e.g., Locke, Hume, Kant, Reid) and show how each one addresses (explicitly or implicitly) the question of voluntariness of belief — this would allow us to see how doxastic involuntarism (or voluntarism) developed historically. Would you like that?

Category mistake for Ryle

For Ryle what is the category mistake?

Gilbert Ryle’s concept of a category mistake (or category error) is one of the central ideas in his 1949 book The Concept of Mind.

🧠 What a “Category Mistake” Means

A category mistake occurs when someone treats something as if it belongs to one logical or conceptual category when it actually belongs to another. In other words, it’s a misclassification of the kind of thing something is.

Ryle coined the term as part of his critique of Cartesian dualism — the view that the mind and body are two distinct substances. He argued that talking about “the mind” as if it were a separate “thing” (like the body) is a category mistake.


🧩 Ryle’s Classic Examples

  1. The University Example

    A visitor is shown the colleges, libraries, and laboratories of Oxford and then asks, “But where is the University?” → The mistake is that the visitor expects “the University” to be another building or physical object — but the University is not another entity in addition to the colleges; it’s the organization or way in which the colleges are arranged and function together.

  2. The Parade Example

    Someone watches a military parade, sees the battalions, artillery, and officers, and then asks, “But where is the Division itself?” → Again, the “Division” isn’t something over and above its parts; it’s the structured whole formed by them.


🧩 Applied to the Mind–Body Problem

Ryle argues that Cartesian dualists commit a category mistake when they treat the mind as a separate, ghostly substance in the same category as the body (a physical object). He calls this the myth of “the ghost in the machine.”

  • The body belongs to the category of physical processes.
  • The mind belongs to the category of behavioral dispositions and capacities (how people act, respond, and think).

To treat the mind as a thing like the body is to miscategorize it — hence, a category mistake.


💬 In Summary

  • Definition: A category mistake is when something is represented as belonging to a logical type or category to which it does not belong.
  • Ryle’s Target: Cartesian dualism (mind-body separation).
  • Purpose: To show that the mind is not a “thing” alongside the body but a way of talking about behavior and abilities.

Would you like me to show how this connects to Ryle’s broader theory of logical behaviorism?

How Flash is emulated

Many of the old Flash game websites seem to largely still work and have playable games. How are they doing this?

Short version: they’re mostly not running the old Adobe plug-in at all. They’re using emulators and repackaged runtimes that run Flash content without the original Flash Player.

Here are the main tricks you’re seeing:

  • Ruffle (Rust → WebAssembly emulator). Lots of sites (and the Internet Archive) drop in a small JS snippet that loads Ruffle. It emulates Flash in the page via WebAssembly, so nothing needs to be installed and it’s far safer than the old plug-in. It already plays most ActionScript 1/2 content well, with growing ActionScript 3 support. (ruffle.rs)

  • “Virtualized” Flash Player (CheerpX for Flash). Some sites—especially ones with more complex AS3 apps—embed CheerpX, which runs an x86 build of Flash Player inside a WebAssembly VM in the browser. This keeps unmodified SWFs working, including enterprise-style apps. (Leaning Technologies Developer Hub)

  • Other web emulators / engines. Projects like AwayFL (TypeScript) are used by a few portals to bring specific games back, including some mobile support. There are also one-off SWF→HTML5 conversions for certain titles. (AwayFL)

  • Local launchers (preservation packs). If you’re using something like BlueMaxima’s Flashpoint, it bundles preserved games with a local launcher and custom browser/tech to bypass site-locks, so you can play a huge offline library. (WIRED)

  • Licensed enterprise variants. After Adobe ended Flash on the web (Dec 31, 2020 EOL; “kill switch” Jan 12, 2021), Adobe partnered with HARMAN to provide paid, supported enterprise builds of Flash Player / AIR for organizations that still need them. Some sites/apps rely on that route. (Adobe)

Why this was needed: Adobe and browsers blocked the classic plug-in in 2021 for safety; the emulation/virtualization approaches bring content back without reinstating the insecure plug-in. (Adobe)

Practical upshot when you visit these sites:

  • Older games (AS1/AS2) usually “just work” via Ruffle.
  • Heavier AS3 titles may need CheerpX/AwayFL or a local launcher like Flashpoint, so compatibility varies from site to site.
  • Security is better than the old days because everything runs sandboxed in WebAssembly rather than a system-level plug-in. (ruffle.rs)

If you want, tell me a couple of the sites/games you’re visiting and I can point out which approach they’re using and the best way to play them today.

Probabilities of conditionals

P(B|A) = P(not (A and not B))

Short answer: not generally true.

  • By definition, [ P(B\mid A)=\frac{P(A\cap B)}{P(A)}=1-\frac{P(A\cap B^{c})}{P(A)}. ] Your right-hand side is (P(\neg(A\land \neg B))=1-P(A\cap B^{c})) without dividing by (P(A)).

  • Counterexample (independent (A,B) with (P(A)=P(B)=0.5)): [ P(B\mid A)=0.5,\quad 1-P(A\cap B^{c})=1-(0.5\times 0.5)=0.75. ] Not equal.

  • When would your equality hold?

    • If (P(A)=1); or
    • If (A\subseteq B) a.s. (so (P(B\mid A)=1) and (P(\neg(A\land \neg B))=1)).
  • Likely fix: [ P(B\mid A)=P\big(\neg(A\land \neg B)\mid A\big)=1-\frac{P(A\cap B^{c})}{P(A)}. ]

Think of what this means for material conditionals

Great prompt. Your RHS, [ P(\neg(A\land \neg B)), ] is exactly (P(A\to B)) if “(\to)” is the material conditional (true except when (A) and not (B)). That gives a clean link:

[ P(A\to B)=1-P(A\land \neg B) =1-P(A)+P(A)P(B\mid A)\quad (P(A)>0). ]

What this means

  • Material conditional (\neq) conditional probability. Generally (P(B\mid A)\ne P(A\to B)). They coincide only in special cases (e.g., (P(A)=1) or (A\subseteq B) a.s.).

  • Rare-antecedent effect. If (P(A)) is small, then (P(A\to B)\approx 1) no matter how small (P(B\mid A)) is. Example: (P(A)=0.01,\ P(B\mid A)=0.10) ⇒ (P(A\to B)=1-0.01+0.01\cdot0.10=0.991) while (P(B\mid A)=0.10). So material “if” is almost always true when (A) is rare—unlike our intuitive reading of “if”.

  • Right “fix” for your equation. The conditional-probability version is: [ P(B\mid A)=P\big(\neg(A\land \neg B)\mid A\big)=P(A\to B\mid A). ]

  • Deeper punchline (Lewis/Adams). Trying to treat some proposition (C) so that (P(C)=P(B\mid A)) in general runs into Lewis’s triviality results; there isn’t a standard event whose probability is always the conditional probability. A popular workaround (Adams’ Thesis) is: the assertability of “If (A) then (B)” tracks (P(B\mid A)), not its truth value as a material conditional.

Takeaway: Material “if” gives (P(A\to B)=1-P(A)+P(A)P(B\mid A)), which can be high for trivial reasons. If you want the intuitive strength of “if (A), (B)”, use (P(B\mid A)), not (P(A\to B)).

How to perform medieval obligational disputations (obligationes)

These guides to performing medieval disputations were created by GPT-5-Thinking based on the (very brief) description of these kinds of disputations written by Sara L. Uckelman in The History of Philosophical and Formal Logic, edited by Malpass and Marfori. Prompts omitted since they contained copyrighted book text, and do not really add to the post.

Positio and depositio

A practical guide to running medieval obligational disputations

(focus: positio, depositio, petitio — treated as one family)

This is a hands-on “how to” you can use in class, a reading group, or a solo drill. It gives you just enough historical fidelity to match medieval practice, but packaged like a modern exercise.


1) Roles, materials, and set-up

Players

  • Opponent (O): proposes sentences (one per turn unless using a “batch” variant).
  • Respondent (R): must answer each sentence by Concede, Deny, or Doubt (some authors also allow Distinguish for genuine ambiguity).

Board/record

  • Keep a running log with three growing sets:

    • Conceded: C
    • Denied (negated): (record negations of all denied sentences)
    • Doubted: ? (for bookkeeping only)

House decisions (choose before you start)

  1. Type: positio (default), depositio (mirror image), or petitio (reduces to positio; see §6).

  2. Relevance regime:

    • Old response (responsio vetus, “dynamic”): a sentence σ is relevant iff σ or ¬σ follows from C ∪ D¬ so far (relevance can change mid-game).
    • New response (responsio nova, “static”): σ is relevant iff σ or ¬σ follows from the positum alone (relevance never changes).
  3. Positum class (for positio): possible (consistent/satisfiable) or impossible (inconsistent). Most practice uses possible.

  4. Shape: simple (single sentence) or complex (conjunction/disjunction).

  5. Stipulations: any extra constraints (for “dependent” positio), e.g., “Treat all arithmetic as standard,” “No metaphysical necessities invoked,” etc. Write stipulations at the top of the log.


2) One rulebook, two relevance tests

Core answering rules (used by everyone):

  1. If relevant and σ follows, Concede σ.

  2. If relevant and ¬σ follows, Deny σ.

  3. If irrelevant:

    • If (known) true, Concede σ.
    • If (known) false, Deny σ.
    • If unknown/undetermined, Doubt σ.

“Follows” = logical consequence under your background logic (usually standard propositional + quantificational reasoning) plus any written stipulations.

Relevance tests (decide once):

  • Dynamic (vetus): compute from the current context C ∪ D¬. Update after every response.
  • Static (nova): compute once from the positum. Do not update during play.

3) Turn structure (script)

Opening move (positio):

  • O1: States the positum ϕ.
  • R1: If the session is possible positio and ϕ is consistent, admit it (Concede). For impossible positio, deny or handle by agreed variant.

Subsequent rounds (k ≥ 2):

  • Ok: utters a sentence σ_k.

  • Rk:

    1. Test relevance (dynamic or static).
    2. Apply the core answering rules.
    3. Update log: add σ_k to C if conceded; add ¬σ_k to **D¬if denied; addσ_k` to ? if doubted.
    4. (Dynamic only) Recompute relevance for the next turn if needed.

Ending the disputation: Stop after N rounds (e.g., 8–12 for a seminar), or when O declares “finis”.


4) Quick decision tree for the Respondent

  1. Are we in positio/depositio/petitio?

    • Depositio with depositum ϕPositio with positum ¬ϕ (mirror the whole game).
    • Petitio (Opponent asks you to take an initial stance) → treat as Positio on that stance (see §6).
  2. Relevance?

    • Dynamic: does σ (or ¬σ) follow from C ∪ D¬?
    • Static: does σ (or ¬σ) follow from ϕ (the positum)?
  3. Then answer:

    • Relevant & follows → Concede
    • Relevant & negation follows → Deny
    • Irrelevant & true → Concede
    • Irrelevant & false → Deny
    • Irrelevant & unknown → Doubt

(Use Distinguish only for genuine scope/ambiguity; write both readings and proceed with the intended one.)


5) Worked micro-sessions

A) Positio (possible), dynamic relevance

Let ϕ := “The capital of England is Paris.” (false but consistent) Let ψ := “It is raining.” (truth value depends on the actual situation)

Turn Opponent says Respondent reasoning (dynamic relevance) R answers Log after move
1 ϕ Possible positio; ϕ is consistent ⇒ admit Concede C = {ϕ}
2 ¬ϕ ∨ ψ Either it follows from ϕ (if ϕ→ψ), or it’s irrelevant. Even if irrelevant, ¬ϕ is true (since ϕ is actually false), so the disjunction is true. Concede C = {ϕ, (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)}
3 ψ Now, from what’s conceded: ϕ together with (¬ϕ ∨ ψ) forces ψ. Hence ψ is relevant and follows. Concede C = {ϕ, (¬ϕ ∨ ψ), ψ}

Lesson: With a false but consistent positum, O can often force unrelated consequents under the dynamic regime by packaging truths about ¬ϕ into disjunctions.

B) Depositio (mirror of positio)

Take depositum ϕ. This is equivalent to running positio with positum ¬ϕ.

  • Start by Denying ϕ.
  • Thereafter, treat every O-move exactly as in positio but with ¬ϕ as the fixed anchor (for static) or as part of the evolving C ∪ D¬ (for dynamic).

C) Positio (possible), static relevance

Same ϕ, ψ as (A), but static relevance (Swyneshed).

  • ψ is irrelevant unless ϕ ⊢ ψ or ϕ ⊢ ¬ψ.
  • (¬ϕ ∨ ψ) is also irrelevant (it does not follow from ϕ).
  • So R answers round 2 by Concede (because it’s actually true), but that does not change relevance.
  • Round 3: ψ remains irrelevant; answer by Concede/Deny/Doubt according to its actual truth value (not because of any dynamic forcing).

Lesson: Static relevance blocks the Opponent’s “force any ψ” trick.


6) Handling the three named formats

  • Positio: Opponent proposes a positum. You run the rules above.
  • Depositio: Opponent proposes a depositum you must reject. Treat as Positio on ¬depositum (mirror image).
  • Petitio: Opponent petitions you to take a stance (e.g., “Concede α”). Reduce to Positio with positum α (or with the requested stance recorded as the initial commitment) and proceed normally. Cosmetic differences aside, the answering behavior is the same.

7) Opponent’s playbook (constructive pressure)

  • With dynamic relevance:

    • Use true disjunctions like ¬ϕ ∨ χ to seed the log; once conceded, many χ turn relevant and follow.
    • Ask for conjunctions to accumulate more in C, expanding what follows.
  • With static relevance:

    • Aim to show that σ (or ¬σ) is a logical consequence of the positum itself—e.g., choose a positum that already encodes the pathway to your target σ.
    • Otherwise, probe actual truths to elicit Concede on irrelevant claims (useful for pedagogy, less for “wins”).

8) Common pitfalls (and how to audit)

  • Mixing regimes: Don’t compute relevance dynamically if you chose static (and vice-versa).
  • Forgetting denial bookkeeping: Always add the negation of what you denied to .
  • Ambiguity drift: If a sentence is ambiguous, Distinguish once; write both readings; choose one and stick to it.
  • Inconsistency check (possible positio): Your C ∪ D¬ should stay consistent throughout. If you derive both σ and ¬σ, something went wrong in reasoning or relevance.

Quick audit at the end

  1. Every relevant sentence: did R answer per consequence?
  2. Every irrelevant sentence: did R answer by actual truth value or “Doubt”?
  3. Dynamic only: does each step’s relevance match C ∪ D¬ at that step?

9) Variants and options you can add

  • Conjoined positio: start with a bundle ϕ₁ ∧ … ∧ ϕ_n. Treat the whole as the positum (static) or as initial concessions (dynamic).
  • Indeterminate/disjunctive positio: begin with ϕ ∨ ψ. Under dynamic rules, Opponent can often steer later relevance by adding true disjuncts.
  • Dependent positio: write extra stipulations (e.g., “assume standard arithmetic,” “ignore metaphysical necessity claims”) and honor them as background constraints.

10) Ready-to-use template (print for the table)

Header:

  • Type: □ positio □ depositio □ petitio
  • Regime: □ dynamic (vetus) □ static (nova)
  • Positum / Depositum / Petition: __________
  • Stipulations: _____________________________

Log sheet

  • C (Conceded): __________________________________
  • D¬ (Negations of Denied): _______________________
  • ? (Doubted): ____________________________________

Per turn checklist for R

  1. Mark relevance (from C ∪ D¬ or from the positum).
  2. Apply core rule (Concede / Deny / Doubt).
  3. Update the log.
  4. (Dynamic) Recompute relevance horizon.

Use this guide as a drill: run a 10-turn positio twice, once dynamic, once static, with the same positum. Compare the two transcripts. You’ll feel exactly why later authors revised the relevance rule—and you’ll be doing obligational disputations like a medieval pro.

Dubitatio

A practical guide to running dubitatio (doubting) obligational disputations

Unlike positio and depositio, dubitatio is built to mix truth with knowledge and to give the Respondent real choices. That’s the point: even when the Respondent knows the dubitatum is true (or false), the rules can still require “I doubt it” or “prove!”—and there isn’t always a unique correct reply. Here’s how to run it smoothly.


1) What makes dubitatio different?

  • The Opponent proposes a sentence δ (the dubitatum).
  • The Respondent is obliged to doubt δ. In many thirteenth-century formulations this surfaces as the stock reply “Prove!” (Latin: proba!). Use either “I doubt it” or “Prove!” for δ; below we standardize on “Prove!” because the classic rule set uses it uniformly.
  • Replies are non-deterministic in key places: for some moves the Respondent may choose between two allowed answers and still be fully correct. That never happens in standard positio/depositio.

2) Roles, materials, and the one modeling choice you must fix

Players

  • Opponent (O): utters one sentence per turn.
  • Respondent (R): answers each sentence.

Permitted answers

  • True / Concede, False / Deny, Doubt, Prove! (request a demonstration), optionally Distinguish for genuine ambiguity.

Log you should keep

  • C (Conceded true), (negations of denied), ? (Doubted). “Prove!” does not add anything to the log.

Classification is always relative to the dubitatum δ (static):

  1. Convertible to δ (logically equivalent to δ)
  2. Opposite of δ and its convertibles (equivalent to ¬δ)
  3. Antecedent of δ (sentence α with α ⊢ δ)
  4. Consequent of δ (sentence β with δ ⊢ β)
  5. Irrelevant to δ (none of the above)

Treat this as an order of precedence: if a sentence is convertible to δ, handle it as convertible, not as a mere consequent, etc.


3) The dubitatio rulebook (Nicholas-style, streamlined)

Let δ be the dubitatum. Then:

  • For δ and anything convertible to δ: reply “Prove!”
  • For ¬δ and anything convertible to ¬δ: reply “Prove!”
  • For any antecedent of δ (something that implies δ): reply “False” or “Prove!”never “True.”
  • For any consequent of δ (something entailed by δ): reply “True” or “Prove!”never “False.”
  • For anything irrelevant to δ: reply by its quality (if you know it’s true → True; if you know it’s false → False; if you don’t know → Doubt).

Why this feels odd (and great!): you might know an antecedent is true, yet still must not answer “True.” Likewise you might know a consequent is false (because you know δ is false), yet you still must not answer “False.” That’s the higher-order tension dubitatio trains.


4) Turn structure

  1. Opening

    • O1: states δ (the dubitatum).
    • R1: “Prove!” (or “I doubt it.”)
  2. Each subsequent round

    • Ok: Opponent utters one sentence σ_k.
    • Classify σ_k against δ using the precedence list.
    • Answer according to the rulebook above.
    • Update the log if and only if you replied True/False/Doubt (not for “Prove!”).
  3. Finish after N rounds (e.g., 8–12), or when O says “finis.”


5) Respondent’s strategy (to “win” = never concede/deny δ)

Assume δ is neither a tautology nor a contradiction (the interesting cases).

  • Absolute blocks: If O states δ, ¬δ, or anything equivalent to either, say “Prove!”.

  • Safe defaults:

    • For antecedents, prefer “Prove!” unless there’s a compelling tactical reason to say “False.”
    • For consequents, prefer “Prove!” unless there’s a compelling reason to say “True.”
  • Irrelevants: Answer by quality, but be wary of disguised equivalences. If you suspect σ is actually equivalent to δ or ¬δ, you must treat it as such and say “Prove!”

  • Do not try to “be helpful.” In dubitatio, saying “True” to an antecedent is illegal, even if it happens to be true.


6) Opponent’s playbook (to pressure well)

  • Test vigilance with convertibles: ¬¬δ, biconditionals, or cleverly rephrased synonyms of δ/¬δ.
  • Tempt “illegal truth”: offer enticing antecedents like δ ∧ χ or χ → δ. R must resist answering “True.”
  • Nudge commitments via consequents: harmless on paper (R can say “True”), but good for teaching how consequences differ from equivalences.
  • Mix in irrelevants with clear truth values to force R to toggle between knowledge, doubt, and proof-demanding.

7) Worked micro-session

Let the dubitatum be:

δ: “The capital of England is London.” (assumed common knowledge: true)

Turn 1

  • O: δ
  • R: Prove! (obligatory)

Turn 2 (consequent)

  • O: δ ∨ “Paris is the capital of England”
  • Class: Consequent of δ (since δ ⊢ δ ∨ …)
  • R (allowed): True or Prove!
  • R (choose): True → add to C.

Turn 3 (antecedent)

  • O: δ ∧ “2+2=4”
  • Class: Antecedent of δ (since δ ∧ … ⊢ δ)
  • R (allowed): False or Prove!, never True
  • R (even though both conjuncts are true): Prove!

Turn 4 (convertible to δ)

  • O: ¬¬δ
  • Class: Convertible to δ
  • R: Prove!

Turn 5 (irrelevant, unknown)

  • O: “It is raining in Rome.”
  • Class: Irrelevant to δ
  • R: Doubt (if the table hasn’t fixed the weather facts)

Turn 6 (opposite)

  • O: ¬δ
  • Class: Opposite of δ
  • R: Prove!

Result: R never concedes nor denies δ, yet lawfully concedes true consequents and treats irrelevants by their actual truth. That’s a model “win.”


8) Common pitfalls & how to audit

  • Wrong precedence. Always check for convertible / opposite-convertible first.
  • Answering by quality on relevant claims. For antecedents/consequents, the special rules override “according to quality.”
  • Illicit helpfulness. Saying “True” to an antecedent—or “False” to a consequent—is not allowed, even if you know it.
  • Forgetting that “Prove!” is content-neutral. It never alters C//?.

End-of-session audit

  1. Every convertible/opposite-convertible got “Prove!”
  2. Every antecedent got “False” or “Prove!” (no “True”).
  3. Every consequent got “True” or “Prove!” (no “False”).
  4. Irrelevants answered by quality (True/False/Doubt).
  5. δ and ¬δ were never conceded or denied.

9) Quick table you can print

Kind (w.r.t. δ) How to recognize Allowed replies Forbidden
δ & convertibles σ ↔ δ valid Prove! True, False, Doubt
Opposite & convertibles σ ↔ ¬δ valid Prove! True, False, Doubt
Antecedent σ ⊢ δ False or Prove! True
Consequent δ ⊢ σ True or Prove! False
Irrelevant none of the above By quality (True/False/Doubt)

10) Ready-to-use template

Header

  • Dubitatum (δ): __________________________
  • Stipulations / background facts: ___________

Log

  • C (Conceded): ____________________________
  • (Negations of denied): ________________
  • ? (Doubted): _____________________________

Per-turn checklist

  1. Classify vs. δ (use precedence).
  2. Choose an allowed reply (remember your options).
  3. Update the log only for True/False/Doubt.

Run the same dubitatio twice: once with a true δ, once with a false δ. In both, a disciplined Respondent can always avoid conceding or denying δ—that’s the distinctive skill dubitatio trains.

Impositio

A practical guide to running impositio (imposition / institutio / appellatio)

What’s new here? In impositio, the Opponent redefines meanings—of words or of whole propositions. After that, the disputation (which may be a positio, depositio, or dubitatio) proceeds under the new lexicon. So you’ll manage two layers every turn:

  1. Semantics layer: apply the imposition(s) to interpret what’s being said.
  2. Obligation layer: answer using the base game’s rules (positio/depositio/dubitatio) on the reinterpreted content.

This guide gives you a working protocol, safe “house rules,” and examples (including how to navigate the tricky truth-relative impositions that can blow up).


1) Roles, materials, and the two ledgers

Players

  • Opponent (O): may introduce impositions (semantic stipulations) and then utter sentences.
  • Respondent (R): must answer each utterance as required by the base game (positio / depositio / dubitatio), but only after interpreting it via the impositions.

Keep two ledgers

  • Lexicon (L): a running list of impositions (term- or proposition-level), with scope and priority (see §3).
  • Obligation log: as in your base game (Conceded/Denied/Doubted etc.). The lexicon does not go here; it lives separately.

2) What can be imposed?

A) Term-level imposition (word → new meaning/extension)

“I impose that man means donkey.”

  • Every occurrence of man now behaves as if it meant donkey.

B) Proposition-level imposition (quoted sentence-name → content)

“I impose that ‘God exists’ signifies precisely that man is donkey.”

  • When someone asserts God exists (unquoted), interpret it as the proposition man is donkey.

C) Truth-relative imposition (meaning depends on the truth-status of the containing sentence)

“I impose that ‘a’ signifies man in any false proposition containing it, donkey in any true one, and (man or non-man) in any doubtful one.”

  • These are advanced; they can create instability (no consistent reading). See §6.

Combining with base games

  • Impositio is a modifier: you can run Positio + Impositio, Depositio + Impositio, or Dubitatio + Impositio. The obligation rules come entirely from the base game; the interpretation comes from the lexicon.

3) House rules that keep play smooth

Adopt these before you start:

  1. Prospective scope: New impositions affect future utterances only (no retroactive reinterpretation of past moves).

  2. Specificity beats generality: If two impositions conflict, the more specific rule for the same expression wins (e.g., a proposition-level imposition outranks a general term-level one inside that proposition).

  3. Latest wins (tie-breaker): Among equally specific rules for the same expression, the later imposition overrides earlier ones.

  4. Quoted vs unquoted: Only quoted strings designate expressions; unquoted occurrences are used and thus reinterpreted.

  5. Well-formedness check: The Opponent may propose any imposition. If a proposed imposition makes some sentences uninterpretable or semantically unstable (see §6), you must either:

    • (Strict medieval flavor) Allow it and play out the contradiction; the result is a reductio of the imposition.
    • (Seminar-friendly) Rule it illicit and require O to restate a coherent imposition. State which policy you’re using.

Write these five lines at the top of the board; you’ll need them.


4) Turn structure (the two-layer “interpret-then-answer” loop)

Opening

  • O may (i) introduce one or more impositions (record in Lexicon L), then (ii) start the base game (e.g., announce a positum; depositum; or dubitatum).

Each subsequent turn

  1. O speaks a sentence σ.

  2. Interpretation pass: compute σ^L by applying the lexicon:

    • Replace term meanings per active term-impositions.
    • If σ matches a proposition-level imposition key, substitute the imposed content.
    • If truth-relative rules are in play, run the stability procedure (see §6).
  3. Obligation pass: treat σ^L as the actual content and respond by your base game’s rules (positio/depositio/dubitatio).

  4. Update the obligation log. (Never write impositions in this log—those stay in L.)


5) Worked basics

A) Simple term-level impositio + Positio

  • Imposition: “I impose that man means donkey.” (record in L)
  • Positum: ϕ: “All men are mortal.”

Interpretation: ϕ^L = “All donkeys are mortal.”

  • If your background facts treat that as true, R must Concede (under positio rules: relevant consequents conceded; irrelevants by quality, etc.).
  • Every later use of man = donkey until revoked.

B) Proposition-level impositio + Dubitatio

  • Imposition: “I impose that ‘God exists’ signifies that man is donkey.”
  • Dubitatum: δ: God exists.

Interpretation: δ^L = “man is donkey.”

  • Under dubitatio, R must reply “Prove!” to δ and to any convertibles of δ (now convertibles of man is donkey).
  • If O later utters God exists, treat it as “man is donkey” each time.

6) Handling truth-relative (switching) impositions

These are the notorious ones (e.g., Lavenham’s ‘a’). They can make a sentence’s own truth determine the meanings inside it, which in turn determine its truth—a loop.

Stability procedure (per sentence σ containing a switcher):

  1. Trial assignment: tentatively label σ as True, interpret terms accordingly, evaluate truth.
  2. Check: If evaluation returns True, you found a fixed point; use that reading.
  3. If not, try False; if it returns False, fixed point found.
  4. If neither True nor False stabilizes, try Doubtful/Unknown (for games that use a third option in the meta; some tables allow this).
  5. If no assignment yields a fixed point → UNSTABLE.

What to do if UNSTABLE? Choose a policy upfront:

  • P1 (Strict/reductive): Let O press the contradiction to refute the imposition. R answers by base rules on each step; when faced with the target unstable sentence, R may declare “No well-defined content under L” (or, in dubitatio, default to “Prove!” endlessly). Conclude: imposition illicit.
  • P2 (Seminar-safe): Your house rule says truth-relative impositions are illicit. R may immediately say: “The proposed imposition yields no stable interpretation; please reimpose.” Then continue with a coherent imposition.

Either way, keep the meta clear in your transcript: mark the sentence UNSTABLE and record which policy you used.

Example: the classic trap Impose: “In any true sentence containing ‘a’, it means donkey; in any false one, man; in any doubtful one, (man or non-man).” Consider σ: Man is a.

  • Assume Truea = donkey ⇒ “Man is donkey” ⇒ False (ordinary background), contradicts assumption.
  • Assume Falsea = man ⇒ “Man is man” ⇒ True, contradicts assumption.
  • Assume Doubtfula = (man or non-man) ⇒ “Man is (man or non-man)” ⇒ True, so not doubtful. → UNSTABLE. Apply policy P1 or P2 above.

7) Opponent’s playbook (how to pressure well)

  • Shallow remapping: Start with a simple term-imposition to make everyone practice clean reinterpretation.
  • Then escalate: Add a proposition-level imposition that collides with the term-level one (e.g., “God exists” → “man is donkey” while mandonkey) and see if R honors specificity and latest-wins.
  • Finally, test vigilance: Introduce a truth-relative imposition; aim a sentence that becomes UNSTABLE. If your table uses P1, push the reductio; if P2, force R to call it illicit crisply.

8) Respondent’s survival kit

  1. Interpret first, answer second. Never apply base-game rules to the unreinterpreted sentence.
  2. Check precedence: convertible/proposition-level rewrites beat generic term switches inside that sentence.
  3. Mark UNSTABLE quickly. Don’t flail; run the stability procedure once, then invoke P1/P2.
  4. Keep ledgers separate. The lexicon is not the commitment set; don’t pollute C / D¬ / ? with semantic rules.

9) Quick table you can print

Situation What you do
New imposition Record in L with time stamp; announce scope (prospective).
Sentence arrives Compute σ^L (apply term- and proposition-level rules; then stability test if needed).
σ^L well-defined Apply base-game rules and log the result.
σ^L UNSTABLE Follow policy P1 (press reductio) or P2 (declare illicit; ask for reimposition).
Conflicting impositions Use specificity, then latest-wins.
Quoted strings Treat as names of expressions (don’t reinterpret).

10) Ready-to-use template

Header

  • Base game: □ positio □ depositio □ dubitatio
  • House policies: scope = prospective; conflicts = specificity → latest-wins; unstable = □ P1 □ P2

Lexicon (L)

  • [t+0] man ↦ donkey (term)
  • [t+1] ‘God exists’ ↦ (man is donkey) (prop)
  • [t+2] ‘a’ ↦ donkey/ man / (man∨¬man) by truth-status (term, switching)

Obligation log (per base game)

  • C: ___ D¬: ___ ?: ___

Per turn checklist

  1. Re-interpret (σ^L).
  2. If switching, run stability test.
  3. Answer by base game.
  4. Update log (not L).

Use this once with only simple impositions, once with mixed (term + proposition), and once with a switching case. After three runs, your table will have the reflexes needed to handle impositio cleanly—interpret first, then oblige.