Self-binding theory sources

“I want to be forced to do x” is a complicated idea. Look up analytic philosophy papers on this

Great topic — “I want to be forced to do x” sits at the crossroads of self-binding, consent/coercion, and what Frankfurt and Williams call “volitional/practical necessity.” Here’s a compact, analytic-philosophy-leaning reading map with quick takeaways:

Self-binding & weakness of will (binding your future self)

• Jon Elster, “Ulysses and the Sirens” (classic on precommitment and imperfect rationality). (SAGE Journals)
• Richard Holton, “Intention and Weakness of Will” (1999) — weakness = over-hasty intention revision (not just akrasia). (rjh221.user.srcf.net)
• Michael Bratman, “Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention” — why we sometimes want external structures so intentions stick. (PhilPapers)
• Alfred Mele on akrasia & self-control — contemporary accounts of self-control failures and strategies. (ResearchGate)
• SEP: Dynamic Choice — philosophical overview of time-inconsistent preferences and commitment. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Wanting others to force you (consent, coercion, and “Ulysses contracts”)

• Robert Nozick, “Coercion” (1969) — the modern baseline analysis of coercive proposals. (PhilPapers)
• Scott A. Anderson, “The Enforcement Approach to Coercion” (2010) — refinements beyond Nozick. (jesp.org)
• SEP: Coercion — current survey of theories and disputes. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
• Maximilian Kiener, “Consenting Under Third-Party Coercion” (2021) — when consent is (in)valid if pressure comes from elsewhere. (Oxford University Research Archive)
• Shomik Bajaj, “Consenting Under Coercion: The Partial Validity Account” (2024) — a recent proposal on partially valid consent. (OUP Academic)
• Tom Walker, “Ulysses Contracts in Medicine” (2012) — can prior consent authorize later enforced treatment? (plus debate). (SpringerLink)
• Rebecca Dresser, “Bound to Treatment: The Ulysses Contract” (1984) — early bioethics treatment of self-binding to future coercion. (PubMed)

“Volitional/practical necessity” (wanting to be unable to do otherwise)

• Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” (1971) — higher-order identification; seeds of volitional necessity. (sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu)
• Frankfurt, Necessity, Volition, and Love — essays on necessities of will (love, ideals) and agency. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)
• Bernard Williams, “Practical Necessity” / “Moral Incapacity” — the sense in which character makes some options unthinkable. (PDCNet)

Promises as self-imposed force (creating reasons/obligations to bind yourself)

• SEP: Promises — how promissory obligation works (relevant to self-binding via promising). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
• David Owens, “A Simple Theory of Promising” (2006) — influential analytic account tying promises to normative control. (White Rose Research Online)

How these clusters fit your question

• Self-binding explains why someone might rationally want mechanisms that later constrain them (overcoming future temptation). (SAGE Journals)
• Consent/coercion asks whether you can license others to coerce you and when such “coercion with consent” is valid. (Oxford University Research Archive)
• Volitional necessity captures the internal version: identifying with cares/commitments so deeply that alternatives feel psychologically impossible — a kind of self-imposed “must.” (OUP Academic)

If you want, I can pull open-access PDFs for just the items you’ll read first, or tailor a starter pack (e.g., 3 on self-binding, 2 on consent/coercion, 2 on volitional necessity).